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Schell: Environmental Law - Agricultural Pollution - The Uncertain Future

Casenote
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-AGRICULTURAL POLLUTION-The
Uncertain Future of Clean Water Act Agricultural Pollution
Exemptions After Concerned Area Residents for the Environment
v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 1793 (1995).

Introduction

Two decades of regulation under the Clean Water Act (CWA or the
Act) 1 have produced significant progress in controlling point source pollution. But those water quality improvements have been jeopardized by a
failure to regulate and control major sources of pollution commonly
known as "nonpoint source" (NPS) pollution.' Agricultural activities are a

1. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
2. See ROBERT W. ADLER E" AL., THE CLEAN WATER ACT: 20 YEARS LATER xii, 14-19, 85
(1993); Brian Weeks, Trends in Regulation of Stormwater and Nonpoint Source Pollution, ELR
NEWS & ANALYSIS, 25 ELR 10300-1 (June 1995) (noting significant improvements in water
quality from regulation of point source discharges). A "point source" is "any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel,
conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation,
or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(14).
3. No federal statutory or regulatory definition of "nonpoint source" exists. It is a de
facto residual category; pollution sources not defined as point sources are nonpoint sources. The
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has adopted the following nonregulatory definition:
NPS pollution is caused by diffuse sources that are not regulated as point sources and
normally is associated with agricultural, silvicultural and urban runoff, runoff from construction activities, etc .... In practical terms, nonpoint source pollution does not result
from a discharge at a specific, single location (such as a single pipe) but generally results
from land runoff, precipitation, atmospheric deposition, or percolation.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, NONPOINT SOURCE GUIDANCE DOCUMENT 3 (Dec. 1987).
See also National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 166 n.28 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (quoting the EPA brief describing a "'non-point source'" as "nothing more than a pollution problem
not involving a discharge from a point source"). The EPA, in its National Water Quality Inventory 1986 Report to Congress, indicated that NPS pollution was the leading cause of water
quality impairment. JACKSON BATTLE & MAXINE I. LIPELES, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: WATER
POLLUTION 422 (2d ed. 1993). See also ADLER El AL., supra note 2, at 171 ("Poison runoff impairs more water bodies, surface and ground, urban and rural, than any other pollution source
in the country.").
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significant source of NPS pollution. 4 NPS pollution generally
escapes regulation under the Act, 5 and significant agricultural activities
that might otherwise be regulated as point sources enjoy specific statutory
exemptions in the Act. 6 The decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in Concerned Area Residents for the Environment v.
Southview Farm,7 could signal a trend toward new rigor in applying the
Act's agricultural exemptions.
Southview Farm (Southview) was one of New York's largest dairies
with 1100 acres and 2200 animals including 1290 mature cows.' The
cows were not pastured, remaining in barns except for periodic milking. 9
Southview employed a liquid/solid manure disposal system l" involving
five storage lagoons, one with a capacity of six to eight million gallons."
Southview applied millions of gallons of liquid manure and chemical
process waste to its fields as fertilizer through use of a "center pivot

4. State assessments of surface water in 1990 and 1991 found that "[c]rop and animal agriculture nonpoint pollution affected about 72 percent of impaired river and stream miles, 56 percent of
impaired lake acres, and 43 percent of impaired estuary square miles." GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFlICE, ANIMAL AGRICULTURE: INFORMATION ON WASTE MANAGEMENT AND WATER QUALITY ISSUES 9
(June 1995) [hereinafter ANIMAL AGRICULTURE]; Drew L. Kershen, Agricultural Water Pollution:
From Point to Nonpoint and Beyond, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Winter 1995, at 3 ("Within
nonpoint sources of pollution, near unanimous agreement exists that agricultural tNPS] pollution is
the largest contributor.").
5. The Act declares that "it is the national policy that programs for the control of
nonpoint sources of pollution be developed and implemented in an expeditious manner so as to
enable the goals of this [Act] to be met." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(7). However, the Act undertook
no direct federal regulation of or responsibility for nonpoint sources, choosing instead to require states to develop their own "management programs" for controlling NPS pollution. 33
U.S.C. § 1329. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1288(b)(2)(G) (calling for areawide waste treatment
management plans, which shall "set forth procedures and methods (including land use requirements) to control to the extent feasible [NPS]"). The Act fails to provide for federal intervention if states fail to develop or implement such plans.
6. The definition of "point source" specifically excludes "agricultural stormwater discharges
and return flows from irrigated agriculture." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
7. 34 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1994).
8. Id.at 116.
9. Id.
10. Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 5, Concerned Area Residents for the Env't v. Southview
Farm, 34 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1994) (No. 93-9229), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1793 (1995) [hereinafter
Appellees' Brief] (on file with the Land and Water Law Review). The manure was collected and
filtered through a separator when it exited the barn. Id. Solids were placed in a concrete storage area
or directly into spreaders. Id. Liquids were pumped into lagoons. Id.
11. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d at 116. This particular lagoon, located on the main property, was
filled with liquid manure piped directly from the separator and with process waste, a mixture of
washwater mixed with chlorine cleanser and a phosphorus acid solution used to wash down the milking parlors and flush the milking machines after each of the three daily milkings. Respondents' Brief
in Opposition at 6-7, Southview Farm v. Concerned Area Residents for the Env't, (No. 94-1316)
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1793 (1995) [hereinafter Respondents' Brief] (on file with the Land and
Water Law Review).
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irrigation system," 2 a "hard hose traveler,"
spreading equipment. 14

3

and conventional manure-

Neighboring land owners, collectively Concerned Area Residents for
the Environment (CARE), sued Southview pursuant to the CWA's citizen-suit provision, 5 alleging multiple CWA violations and asserting
pendent state common law trespass, nuisance, and negligence claims. 6 All
CWA claims related to CARE's allegation that Southview improperly
applied manure to its fields, resulting in unpermitted discharges of pollutants into adjacent waters. 1' Alleged CWA violations 8 included:

12. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d at 116. Pipes connected a self-propelled pivot to the liquid manure storage lagoons. Id. The diameter of the circle could be adjusted to fit the field being fertilized.
Id. Southview's piping system extended under state and local highways to connect its various
properties to the lagoons, Respondents' Brief, supra note 11, at 7.
13. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d at 116. The hard hose traveler consisted of flexible plastic tubing
which could be unwound from a large reel. Id. The hose had a nozzle on the end and could spray
liquid manure 150 feet in either direction. Id.
14. Id. Southview used both tractor-pulled and self-propelled spreaders with individual carrying capacity of approximately 5,000 gallons to spread manure not processed through the separation
system. Id.
15. 33 U.S.C. § 1365. Citizen suits serve as adjuncts to federal, state, and local enforcement
efforts which seek to promote compliance with environmental laws. Beverly McQueary Smith, Recent
Developments in Citizens' Suits Under Selected Federal Environmental Statutes, ALI-ABA Course of
Study, C981 ALI-ABA 701 (Feb. 15, 1995). In general terms, the citizen-suit provision of the CWA
authorizes any citizen to initiate a civil action against any person, including the U.S. government, any
other governmental entity or agency (within the limits of the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution) who violates the statute, or an order of the Administrator of EPA or a State, or the Administrator for failure to perform a non-discretionary duty or act. 33 U.S.C. § 1365. The courts may require
compliance and the payment of civil penalties and award litigation costs including reasonable attorney
and expert witness fees to the prevailing or substantially prevailing party. Id. See Jeffrey G. Miller,
Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws Part 1, ELR NEWS & ANALYSIS, 13 ELR
10309 (October 1983).
16. Concerned Area Residents for the Env't v. Southview Farm, 834 F. Supp. 1410, 1412
(W.D.N.Y. 1993) (CARE 1) (reporting the district court's opinion denying Southview's motions to
dismiss and for summary judgment). The trespass claim was based on evidence that nitrates from
Southview's manure operations were leaching into plaintiffs' groundwater. Id. at 1420. CARE also
claimed Southview's contamination of area waterways constituted both a public and private nuisance.
Id. at 1421. CARE's negligence claim was based on an allegation that one discharge was done intentionally to harm and cause emotional distress to two individual plaintiffs. Id. at 1412.
17. Id. at 1412. The district court rejected Southview's argument that manure is not a "pollutant" within the meaning of 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a), which makes unlawful "the discharge of any pollutant" without a permit pursuant to the Act. Id. at 1416. The Act defines "pollutant" to include
"dredged spoil, solid waste. . . . sewage .... sewage sludge .... chemical wastes, biological materials, . . . and agricultural waste discharged into water." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6). The court relied on
Carr v. Alia Verde Indus., Inc., 931 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir. 1991) (treating manure-laden water used to
irrigate and fertilize fields as a pollutant), and Higbee v. Starr, 598 F. Supp. 323, 330 (E.D. Ark.
1984) (holding as a matter of law that accumulated hog waste, mixed with water and used as fertilizer, was "agricultural waste"), aft'd, 782 F.2d 1048 (8th Cir. 1985); CARE I, 834 F. Supp. at 1416.
Further, the court held that there was no evidence Congress intended "agricultural waste" in the
CWA to have the same meaning as in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42
U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991(k) (1986 & Supp. 1993), cited by Southview. Moreover, the RCRA regula-

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1996

3

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 31 [1996], Iss. 1, Art. 4
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXXI

(1) On July 13, 1989, two individual plaintiffs observed liquid

manure spreading and tracked it downfield to a swale on
Southview's property that lead to a drain tile passing through a
stonewall to a ditch that flowed off Southviews's property and
downstream into a stream, ultimately flowing into the Genesee
River.' 9
(2) On July 12, 1989, and August 22, 1989, two individual plaintiffs also saw Southview's vehicles spreading a large amount of
liquid manure in the same field they observed on July 13, 1989,
but did not track the flow of the manure.20
(3) On September 26, 1990, and April 15, 1991, Southview had
spread manure on certain areas of its fields until it began to
"pool." When it subsequently rained, the manure flowed off
Southview property."
The United States District Court for the Western District of New
York denied Southview's motion for summary judgment.22 The jury found
that Southview had committed five CWA violations and common law tres-

pass. 23 Partially granting Southview's motion for judgment as a matter of

tions, in fact, "implicitly support the view that manure used as a fertilizer constitutes solid waste." Id.
at 1417. The Second Circuit had earlier concluded, based on its reading of 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (the
basic prohibition on discharge of pollutants into navigable waters) and § 1342(a)(1) (the National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit section) together, that "absent a permit, 'the
discharge of any pollutant by any person' is unlawful. 33 U.S.C. § 131 1(a)." United States v. Plaza
Health Labs., Inc., 3 F.3d 643, 645 (2d Cir. 1993).
18. The six alleged CWA violations on which the jury found in favor of Southview are omitted.
19. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d at 118-19.
20. Id. at 119-20.
21. Id. at 120-21.
22. The district court found that CARE alleged sufficient injury-in-fact to support standing and
that CARE's complaint sufficiently alleged CWA violations. CARE 1. 834 F. Supp. at 1413-20. The
court held that factual issues precluded summary judgment on CARE's trespass and nuisance claims.
Id. at 1420-22. Moreover, the court granted CARE's pre-trial motion to file a supplemental complaint. Id. at 1413. The court allowed CARE to add a CWA violation arising out of manure discharges occurring after the suit commenced and a violation based on information obtained through discovery. Id. at 1412-13. The court also allowed CARE to add its pendent negligence claim. lId. Additionally, the court accepted an amicus brief from the Farm Bureau, a private organization representing
farmers' interests, even though the organization had contributed $10,000 to Southview's defense. Id.
at 1413. (The court had earlier denied Southview's motion to dismiss the complaint. Id. at 1412 n. 1).
23. Concerned Area Residents for the Env't v. Southview Farm, 834 F. Supp. 1422, 1423
(W.D.N.Y. 1993) (CARE I) (reporting the district court's opinion granting Southview's motion for
judgment as a matter of law on the five CWA violations). The jury found in favor of Southview on
six other alleged CWA violations and the state law nuisance and negligence claims. Id.
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law following the jury verdict in CARE's favor,"4 the district court set
aside the jury's verdict on the five CWA violations while sustaining the
verdict on the trespass claim.'
The United State Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit unanimously reversed the district court.' The court held that the swale coupled
with the drain tile leading into a stream was "in and of itself a point
source" 27 and, alternatively, that "the manure spreading vehicles themselves were point sources." ' The Second Circuit declined to apply the
CWA's "agricultural stormwater discharge" exemption,29 holding that a
reasonable jury could conclude that the discharges were not the result of
rainfall but of oversaturation of the fields with liquid manure." The court
also held that Southview's liquid manure spreading operations were a
"point source within the meaning of CWA section 1362(14) because the
farm itself falls within the definition of a concentrated animal feeding
operation ('CAFO') and is not subject to the agricultural exemption." 3
Without stating any reasons, the Supreme Court denied Southview's
petition for a writ of certiorari. 2
"

This casenote focuses on the CWA violations that occurred at
Southview. It discusses the Second Circuit's analysis of what constitutes a
"point source" and what constitutes a "concentrated animal feeding operation" (CAFO) within the meaning of the CWA. It also analyzes the Second Circuit's interpretation of the "agricultural stormwater discharge"
exemption under the Act."

24. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b).

25. CARE I, 834 F. Supp. at 1423. The district court held that the evidence presented at trial
did not show a point source discharge as a matter of law. Id. at 1424-35. The court concluded that
runoff from the site where the manure was applied did not constitute a discharge from a "point
source" either because it was an "agricultural stormwater discharge" exempt from the CWA's definition of "point source," or because there was no discharge from "any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance." Id. at 1426-35. The court also held there was sufficient evidence to support
CARE's trespass claim and that expert testimony regarding the claim was permissible because
Southview waived the issue by failing to object at trial and the testimony was sufficient to support the
jury verdict, not merely speculative. Id. at 1435-37.
26. Soulhview Farm, 34 F.3d at 123.

27. Id. at 118.
28. Id. at 119.

29. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
30. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d at 120-21.
31. Id. at 115.
32. 115 S. Ct. 1793 (1995).
33. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
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BACKGROUND

The broad remedial purposes of the Clean Water Act are to "restore
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
maintain
and
Nation's waters." 34 The CWA provides that, absent a permit, "the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful." 35 Permits are
issued pursuant to the Act's federally mandated and supervised National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES).36 Point sources 37 are
subject to a permit requirement, 8 and all point source discharges are
illegal unless permitted. 39 Nonpoint sources, however, are outside the
NPDES and largely unregulated.' °
Thus, for regulatory purposes, the point-nonpoint source distinction
is critical. At a practical level, the CWA "subjects point source pollution
to direct, reasonably aggressive, and reasonably effective federal regulation . . . [and] leaves nonpoint source pollution primarily to the states,
with the federal role being indirect, almost passive, and largely ineffective." 4 1 Excluding CAFOs, "most water pollution generated by agricultural activities is nonpoint source," thus, outside direct federal regulation.42
NPS pollution is addressed primarily through a planning process, placing
primary responsibility on the states.43

34. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
35. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). The Act defines "pollutant" to include "dredged spoil, solid
waste ....

sewage ....

sewage sludge, . . . chemical wastes, biological materials, . . . and agricul-

"
c
tural waste discharged into water." Id. § 1362(6). [DIis harge of a pollutant" includes "any addition
of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source." Id. § (12).
36. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a). An NPDES permit sets maximum discharge levels for various pollutants based on technology-based, uniform national effluent limitations. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b). The
permit also establishes monitoring and reporting requirements, and delineates the permittee's obligations. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a).
37. See supra note 2.
38. 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
39. 33 U.S.C. § 1311.
40. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1288, 1329.
41. George A. Gould, Agriculture, Nonpoint Source Pollution, and Federal Law, 23 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 461, 474 (1990). See also Weeks, supra note 2, at 10300-12 n.16 (noting that
"[allthough nonpoint sources have become the primary source of surface water pollution in the United
States, EPA has a limited regulatory mandate and can only encourage the use of nonpoint source
control measures"); Robert D. Fentress, Nonpoint Source Pollution, Groundwater, and the 1987
Water Quality Act: Section 208 Revisited?, 19 ENVTL. L. 807, 808 (1989) (CWA left "regulation of
nonpoint sources to the states.").
42. Gould, supra note 41, at 474.
43. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1288, 1329 See supra note 5.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol31/iss1/4

6

Schell: Environmental Law - Agricultural Pollution - The Uncertain Future
1996

CASENOTE

Regulatory Status of AgriculturalActivities

Following passage of the CWA, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) adopted an expansive view of point source pollution, including
many commonplace agricultural activities." The Act required the Admin-

istrator of the EPA to promulgate effluent limitation guidelines for point
sources within one year of its passage.' Faced with the difficulties of
permitting numerous small, geographically dispersed point sources, in
1973 the EPA issued regulations exempting designated categories of point

source discharges, including all silvicultural and many agricultural activities, from the NPDES permit requirements.' The Natural Resources
Defense Council then brought suit, challenging the EPA's authority to
exclude certain point sources from permit requirements. 4 The Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit rejected the EPA's "administrative

infeasibility" argument" and held that "the EPA Administrator does not
have authority to exempt categories of point sources from the permit
requirements .

. .

."

The court went on to suggest that, if the EPA

could not find a practical way to permit the more troublesome point
sources, "the remedy lies with Congress. 50
Subsequently, Congress did act to limit application of the NPDES
program to agriculture. First, Congress amended the term "point source"
to specifically exclude "return flows from irrigated agriculture."'" Con-

44. "For example, EPA considered irrigation return flows and rainfall runoff to be point sources if the return flows and runoff were in any way channeled or collected by human activity prior to
being discharged into the waters of the United States." Kershen, supra note 4, at 3.
45. 33 U.S.C. § 1314. When the EPA failed to issue regulations within a year, a suit was
brought to force compliance. As a result, a federal district court established a time table for EPA
compliance. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 6 E.R.C. 1033 (D.D.C. 1973), stay
granted in part, denied in part, 7 E.R.C. 1123 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other
grounds, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
46. 40 C.F.R. § 125.4 (1975). See 38 Fed. Reg. 18000-04 (1973). Exempted activities included "[d]ischarges of pollutants from agricultural and silvicultural activities, including irrigation
return flow and runoff from orchards, cultivated crops, [and] pastures," and "[d]ischarges from animal confinement facilities" below a certain size. 40 C.F.R. § 125.40) (1975).
47. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 396 F. Supp. 1393 (D.D.C. 1975),
aff~d sub noam. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
48. The EPA argued that requiring permits for all point sources would overwhelm the
agency with millions of applications and that "in order to conserve the Agency's enforcement
resources for more significant point sources of pollution, it is necessary to exclude these smaller
sources of pollutant discharges from the permit program." NRDC v. Costle, 568 F.2d at 1373,
1377-82.
49. Id. at 1377.
50. id. at 1383.
51. Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 33(b), 91 Stat. 1577 (1977) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14)
(1982 & Supp. V 1988)).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1996

7

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 31 [1996], Iss. 1, Art. 4
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXXI

gress also prohibited the EPA from requiring, directly or indirectly,
NPDES permits for irrigation return flows. 2 Then, in the Water Quality
Act of 1987, Congress again amended the definition of "point source" to
exclude "agricultural stormwater discharges." 3 Consequently, many
identifiable and discrete agricultural pollution sources are, by definition,
nonpoint sources beyond the purview of federal regulation. 4
Agricultural Stormwater DischargeExemption

Since 1987, agricultural stormwater runoff has been consistently
considered NPS, exempt from the Act and other regulatory schemes. 5
The Act, however, fails to define "agricultural stormwater discharge. " 56
Case law sheds little light on the "agricultural stormwater discharge"
exception. 7 In Costle, the EPA described "runoff" as "wastewaters generated by rainfall that drain over terrain into navigable waters, picking up
pollutants along the way," 58 recognizing that rainwater cannot migrate
over land without picking up some measure of pollutants. The EPA's
descriptive focus on the causal role of the natural precipitation is reflected
in its stormwater regulations.
The phrase "agricultural stormwater discharge" is not defined in any
EPA regulations, although "stormwater" is defined by regulation as "storm
water runoff, snow melt runoff, and surface runoff and drainage. "5 "Storm
water runoff" is defined further as including "runoff caused by rainfall...

52. Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 33(c), 91 Stat. 1577 (1977) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1342(1) (1982
& Supp. V 1988)).
53. Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 503, 101 Stat. 75 (1987) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1982 &
Supp. V 1988)).
54. "For example, irrigation return flows are designated as 'nonpoint sources' by section
402(1) of the Clean Water Act, even though the discharge is through a discrete conveyance." EPA,
supra note 3, at 3.
55. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). See also 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(e) (exempting "introduction of pollutants from non point-source agricultural and silvicultural activities, including storm water runoff from
orchards, cultivated crops, pastures, range lands, and forest lands" from permit requirements). The
language of this regulatory exemption was also contained in the EPA's earlier attempt to exempt
certain categories of point sources from permit requirements without congressional authorization. 40
C.F.R. § 125.40) (1975). See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
56. According to the Act, "[tihe term 'discharge' when used without qualification includes a
discharge of a pollutant, and a discharge of pollutants." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(16). The legislative history
notes only that the CWA is amended by "providing that Agricultural Stormwater Discharges are not
defined as a point source." Section-by-Section Aj:afysis, 133 CONG. REC. H131 (Jan. 7, 1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5,41.
57. In CARE 11, the district court noted that "the parties have not submitted, and the court
has not found, any cases interpreting [the agricultural stormwater discharge] exception." 834 F.
Supp. at 1427.
58. 568 F.2d 1369. 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (emphasis added).
59. 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(13).
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which flows overland" rather than percolating into the soil.' The EPA's test
for determining whether a stormwater discharge has occurred is whether the
discharge was "caused or initiatedsolely by naturalprocesses such as precipto exclude from the
itation," reflecting "[t]he intent of the regulations
NPDES permit program all natural runoff from agricultural land which results from precipitation events." 6 In other words, the EPA implementing
regulations exempt discharges caused by precipitation, not those that just
happen to occur on a rainy day.62
ConcentratedAnimal Feeding Operations
The CWA specifically identifies a "concentrated animal feeding
operation" as a point source,63 but does not further define the term. The
implementing regulations define a CAFO as an "animal feeding operation" (AFO) that meets the criteria of Appendix B of the rules.' An AFO
is "a lot or facility" where "(i) [a]nimals . . . have been, are, or will be
stabled or confined and fed or maintained for a total of 45 days or more
in any 12-month period, and, (ii) [crops, vegetation forage growth, or
post-harvest residues are not sustained in the normal growing season over
any portion of the lot or facility."' 5 The EPA has further specified that a
CAFO "does not include areas of the facility where crops or forage crops
are maintained throughout the growing season."' The EPA's regulations
allow the director of a state NPDES program to "designate any animal
feeding operation as a [CAFO] upon determining that it is67 a significant
contributor of pollution to the waters of the United States.
PRINCIPAL CASE
In Southview Farm, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district court's judgment as a matter of law, holding that liquid

60. 58 Fed. Reg. 7610, 7614 (1993) (emphasis added).
61. 41 Fed. Reg. 7963, 7964 (1976) (emphasis added).
62. As the court noted in Southview Farm, "all discharges eventually mix with precipitation
run-off in ditches or streams or navigable waters so the fact that the discharge might have been mixed
with run-off cannot be determinative." 34 F.3d at 121.
63. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
64. 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b). The pertinent criterion of Appendix B requires that the AFO contain 700 mature dairy cattle. 40 C.F.R. Pt. 122, app. B. (Southview kept more than 1200 mature
dairy cattle on its feed lot. Southview Farm. 34 F.3d at 116, 122). If an AFO meets the criteria of
Appendix B, it is presumed to be a CAFO unless the only time a discharge of pollutants into navigable waters occurs is "in the event of a 25 year, 24-hour storm event." 40 C.F.R. Pt. 122, app. B.
65. 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(1).
66. 58 Fed. Reg. 7610, 7616 (1993).
67. 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(c)(1).
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manure-spreading operations at a dairy farm constitute a "point source"
under the Act.6" As an initial matter the court ruled, without discussion, that
liquid manure is a pollutant within the meaning of the Act.69 The court then
held that a swale in one of Southview's fields that "collected and
channelized" the liquid manure, coupled with a pipe leading into a ditch
feeding into a stream, "was in and of itself a point source." 7' Explicitly
relying on case law, the court also held, alternatively, that Southview's conventional manure-spreading vehicles constituted point sources.7' The court

upheld the jury verdict concerning the July 13, 1989, CWA violation when
plaintiffs actually tracked the manure migrating off Southview's property, 72
and the violations occurring on July 12 and August 22, 1989, when the same

manure-spreading activities occurred.73

The court held that, despite the occurrence of rain, the September 26,
1990, and April 15, 1991, incidents74 were not within the Act's "agricultural
stormwater" exemption." s The court found that the jury had a reasonable
basis to conclude that the discharges were "primarily caused by the oversaturation of the fields rather than the rain," and that "sufficient quantities"
76
of manure were present to preclude classifying the runoff as "stormwater.

68. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d at 115; 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
69. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d at 117. See supra note 35.
70. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d at 118-19. The court reaffirmed its position in Dague v. City of
Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1354 (2d Cir. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 112 S. Ct. 2638 (1992),
that '[t]he definition of a point source is to be broadly interpreted" (railroad culvert through which
pollutants were conveyed from a marsh pond into the rest of a wetland held to be a point source
under the CWA). See also United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 373 (10th Cir. 1979)
("The concept of a point source was designed to further this [regulatory] scheme by embracing the
broadest possible definition of any identifiable conveyance from which pollutants might enter the
waters of the United States."). The court distinguished United States v. Plaza Health Labs., Inc., 3
F.3d 643, 649 (2d Cir. 1993) ("There the court simply refused to treat a human being as a 'point
source' under the criminal provisions of the [CWA] by virtue of the role of lenity."). Southview
Farm, 34 F.3d at 119.
71. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d at 119. The Act defines "point source" to include a "container"
or "rolling stock." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). The court cited United States v. Tull, 615 F. Supp. 610,
622 (E.D. Va. 1983) (holding bulldozers and dump trucks constitute point sources under CWA),
769 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 412 (1987); Avoyelles
aft'd,
Sportmen's League, Inc. v. Alexander, 473 F. Supp. 525, 532 (W.D. La. 1979) (holding land-clearing, ditch excavation, and discing equipment not used in connection with "normal farming" are point
sources of pollution under CWA); United States v. Weisman, 489 F. Supp. 1331, 1337 (M.D. Fla.
1980) (holding bulldozers and dump trucks are point sources under CWA).
72. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. The court concluded that proof of three subsequent discharges and photographic evidence of discharges gave the jury sufficient evidence, in addition to plaintiffs' testimony, from which to infer that the July 12 and August 22, 1989, CWA violations did occur. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d at 120.
74. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
75. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d at 120-21; 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
76. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d at 121.
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The court also held that Southview's manure-spreading operations
were a point source "because the farm itself falls within the definition of a
[CAFO].""7 The court ruled that Southview's "feed lot" was a CAFO,
rather than an agricultural NPS, because it did not contain any vegetation
within the confinement area. 75 The court rejected Southview's argument
that the fields adjacent to the confinement area prevented the farm from
being an AFO. 79 Reasoning by analogy to regulation of a "feed lot" under
an NPDES permit,' the court adopted the United States' amicus position"1
that "the vegetation criterion pertains only to the lot or facility in which
the animals are confined," not to fields adjacent to the feed lot.'

In deciding not to exempt Southview from regulation as a CAFO,
the court relied on the EPA's two-fold rationale for limiting the NPDES
vegetation exemption to the actual confinement area, 3 First, the presence
of vegetation suggests a lower density of animals and, second, the vegetation helps to assimilate the manure and reduce pollution.' Since
Southview's 1100 acres of adjacent cropland were outside the lot and the
cows were never pastured thereon, the exemption did not apply.' s The
court thus concluded that Southview's operation was a CAFO point
source subject to federal regulation under the Act rather than an agricultural NPS exempted by the CWA and left to state regulation.' As a resuit, Southview's unpermitted point source discharges violated the CWA.

77. Id. 34 F.3d at 115 (emphasis added). A CAFO is defined by regulation. 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.23. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text. CAFOs are, by definition, point sources. 33
U.S.C. § 1362(14).
78. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d at 123 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(1)). The court consistently characterizes the confinement area where Southview kept its cows in barns as a "feed
lot." Id. at 122-23.
79. 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(1). See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
80. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d at 123. In the regulations setting forth NPDES technology-based
effluent limitations, a "feed lot" is defined as "a concentrated, confined animal or poultry growing
operation for meat, milk or egg production, or stabling, in pens or houses wherein the animals or
poultry are fed at the place of confinement and crop or forage growth or production is not sustained
in the area of confinement." 40 C.F.R. § 412.11 (b) (emphasis added).
81. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8, Concerned Area Residents for the
Environment v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114 (No. 93-9229), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1793
(1995) [hereinafter Brief for U.S.] (on file with the Land and Water Law Review); see also
Southview Farm, 34 F.3d at 123.
82. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d at 123 (emphasis added).
83. Id. (quoting 39 Fed. Reg. 5703, 5704 (1974)).
84. Brief for U.S., supra note 81, at 9.
85. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d at 116, 122-23. The court cited Higbee v. Starr, 598 F.
Supp. 323, 325 (E.D. Ark. 1984) (hogs confined in finishing houses where waste fell through
slats in floors into holding basins and was then spread on adjacent pastureland for fertilizer; hog
farm held to be a CAFO).
86. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d at 123.
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ANALYSIS

The CWA contains no general exemption for agricultural pollution
sources. Given the significant contribution of agricultural pollution to the
total water pollution problem,' Congress could not have meant to put all
agricultural pollution discharges beyond the reach of the NPDES permit
requirements and still hope to meet the objectives of the Act to "restore
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation's waters.""8 The fact that Congress has twice exempted specific
agricultural discharges from point source regulation 9 suggests that other
agricultural discharges meeting the definitional requirements do constitute
point sources within the purview of the CWA. The Second Circuit's
Southview Farm opinion is a reasonable interpretation of both the CWA
and implementing EPA regulations, particularly in light of current trends
in U.S. agriculture in general and livestock production in particular.
The Growing Problem of Animal Waste' Disposal
American agriculture is becoming increasingly "industrialized."91
For the past twenty-five years, U.S. agriculture has moved toward
large confinement operations.' In the beef industry, only two percent
of the feedlots in the Great Plains region in 1980 contained more than
1000 head; by 1991, thirty-two percent of the region's feedlots contained more than 32,000 head.93 The amount of waste produced at
large confinement facilities is staggering. In Arkansas, the Department
of Pollution Control and Ecology reported that the waste produced by
chickens, swine, and cattle in two counties totalled thirty million

87. "Agriculture continues to be the single largest contributor to [NPS] problems in the
nation. It is the leading source of impacts to rivers, lakes, and wetlands . . . . [Algriculture is
the leading source of water pollution in the United States, even when point source impacts are
included in the analysis." EPA, MANAGING NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION 2, 17 (Jan. 1992).
88. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
89. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
90. "Animal agriculture waste generally refers to manure but also includes urine, animal carcasses, bedding, poultry litter, and wastewater." ANIMAL AGRICULTURE, supra note 4, at I n. 1.
91.

Neil D. Hamilton, Feeding Our Future:Six PhilosophicalIssues Shaping AgriculturalLaw,

72 NEB. L. REV. 210, 213 (1993).
92. A GAO study found that in the top ten hog-producing states, the inventory of the largest
operations (500 or more hogs) increased from approximately 40% of the total inventory in those
states in 1978 to 77% in 1994. ANIMAL AGRICULTURE, supra note 4, at 2. From 1974 to 1992, sales

of broilers attributable to large producers (100,000 or more birds sold) increased from about 70% of
national sales to 97%. Id.
93. Larry C. Frarey & Staci J. Pratt, Environmental Regulation of Livestock Production Operations, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Winter 1995, at 8.
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pounds per day, equivalent to that generated by a city of over eight
million people." Just the mature cows on Southview produced more
than fifty tons of wet manure each day.9'
The impact of this manure-based pollution on water quality is
both diverse and significant. Excessive nutrients, such as nitrogen and
phosphorus, "can have a toxic effect on aquatic organisms, or they can
contribute to excessive enrichment, which reduces the amount of dissolved oxygen in the water."96 Excessive enrichment results in eutrophication. 9 Nitrates, a compound of nitrogen, entering surface waters
or leaching into groundwater as in Southview Farm9" pose significant
human health risks." Manure also introduces to water pathogens, such
as bacteria and protozoa, which can cause severe illness in humansoo
If the trend toward large animal production facilities continues, the
need to control both the direct and indirect discharge of manure-based
pollutants into the nation's waters will grow increasingly severe. Federal
regulation may be necessary to prevent large confinement operations from
'shopping' among states for the lowest possible environmental standards."' The Second Circuit's decision recognizes the ability of the
94. John T. Holleman, In Arkansas Which Comes First, the Chicken or the Environment?, 6
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 21, 27 (1992).
95. An average mature dairy cow produces approximately 82 pounds of wet manure each day.
Frarey & Pratt, supra note 93, at 8. Southview had approximately 1290 mature cows at the time of
the suit. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d at 116.
96. TROUT UNLIMITED, THE INVISIBLE MENACE: AGRICULTURAL POLLUTED RUNOFF IN OUR
NATION'S STREAMS 5 (Feb. 1994).

97. "The enrichment of lakes and streams with nutrients, such as nitrogen and phosphorus, can
trigger accelerated plant growth, algal blooms, reduced oxygen content of the water, and other changes in
the aquatic ecosystem that are commonly referred to as eutrophication." Deborah Moore & Zach Willey,
Water in the American West: Institutional Evolution and EnvironmentalRestoration in the 21st Century, 62
U. Colo. L. Rev. 775, 777 n.8 (1991). Eutrophication decreases fish populations, and gives water an unpleasant odor and taste. T. PHIPPS & P. CROSSON, Agriculture and the Environment:An Overview, in AGRICULTURE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 7 (T. Phipps et al. eds., 1986). Concern about eutrophication of lakes
was a driving force behind passage of the "clean lakes" section of the CWA. 33 U.S.C. § 1324. See S.
Rep. No. 370, at 69-70, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4394-95.
98. See supra notes 16, 23, 25 and accompanying text.
99. Nitrates in drinking water can cause methemoglobinemia or "blue baby syndrome," a potentially
fatal condition resulting from the blood's reduced ability to carry oxygen. See FRESHWATER FOUNDATION,
NITRATES & GROUNDWATER: A PUBLIC HEALTH CONCERN (1988). High levels of nitrates in drinking
water have also been linked to increased cancer levels. AGRICULTURAL LAW AND POLICY INSTITUTE, ISSUES BOOKLET No. 1, FARMING & GROUNDWATER: AN INTRODUCTION 32 (1988).
100. GRAZING MANAGEMENT: AN ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 155-56 (Rodney K. Heitschmidt &
Jerry W. Stuth eds., 1991). Microorganisms in waste manure may cause up to 150 diseases including
cryptosporidosis, cholera, tuberculosis, typhoid fever, salmonella, and polio. EPA, REPORT OF THE
EPA/STATE FEEDLOT WORKGROUP 17-18 (Sept. 1993).
101. There have already been reports of large confinement operations relocating in search of the
state with the lowest environmental standards. See, e.g., Steve Marbery, By Moving Hog Operations
to Oklahoma, Tyson Finds Welcome, FEEDSTUFFS, June 29, 1992, at 9.
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CWA's statutory and regulatory framework to address the environmental
risks posed by large industrialized agricultural operations.
ControllingAgricultural Pollution - CAFOs & Citizen Suits
In exempting only certain agricultural operations from the CWA
permit requirements, Congress arguably was trying to protect traditional mixed-use agricultural enterprises." Accordingly, the EPA's
regulatory framework places only large confinement operations within
the reach of the NPDES. Dairies with fewer than 700 mature cattle" 3
or traditional farms where cows are pastured are not CAFOs.'04 If the
presence of contiguous fields is sufficient to trigger exemption from
the CAFO permit requirements, virtually all animal confinement operations would be beyond the reach of the CWA, 1°5 and Congress' statutory designation of CAFOs as point sources" would be negated.
Contrary to Southview's characterization, the Second Circuit's
decision does not mean "that a large dairy farm would have to grow
crops inside its cattle barns" to avoid designation as a CAFO.' ° In
applying the EPA's "vegetation criterion" to the confinement area, the
court simply required actual mixed-use that would help mitigate animal
waste production, rather than the mere presence of adjacent fields, to
prevent classification as a CAFO.' 08 Thus, the Second Circuit's hold-

102. Hamilton, supra note 91, at 215-16. See generally WILLIAM P. BROWNE ET AL., SACRED
COWS AND HOT POTATOES: AGRARIAN MYTHS IN AGRICULTURAL POLICY (1992). The courts have

also distinguished single and mixed-used animal production. Single-use concentrated animal production without crop activity typically has been viewed as more industrial than agricultural. See Farmegg
Prods., Inc. v. Humboldt County, 190 N.W.2d 454, 459 (Iowa 1971) (holding land used for concentrated poultry production where no feed crops are grown is not for "agricultural purposes").
103. 40 C.F.R. Pt. 122.23(b), app. B; 58 Fed. Reg. 7616 (1993).
104. The EPA distinguishes CAFOs from "confined in pasture operations" (CIPOs). The regulatory definition of CAFOs excludes operations where animals are confined in an outdoor, vegetated
environment. "Confinement of animals on pasture lands are [sic] not regulated under [the CAFO]
permit." 58 Fed. Reg. 7616 (1993) (emphasis added). In theory, the presence of vegetation where
livestock are confined suggests a lower density of animals and allows the vegetation to help assimilate

manure; thus, CIFOs pose less severe waste management problems than CAFOs. See supra notes 8084 and accompanying text.
105. "EPA presumes that most, if not all, feedlots have some vegetation nearby." EPA, PERCEPrnONS ABOUT EPA's ACTIONS IN THE SOUTHVIEW FARM CASE 1 (Dec. 1994).
106. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).

107. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 2, Southview Farm v. Concerned Area Residents for the
Env't, (No. 94-[1316]) cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1793 (1995) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter
Petitioners' Brief] (on file with the Land and Water Law Review).
108. Adjacent crop or pasture lands have not precluded other courts from designating animal
confinement areas as CAFOs. See Higbee v. Starr, 598 F. Supp 323, 325, 330 (E.D. Ark. 1984)
(holding farm with 10 hog finishing houses is a CAFO even though liquid manure is spread on adjacent pastureland as fertilizer), aff'd without op., 782 F.2d 1048 (8th Cir. 1985); Carr v. Alta Verde
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ing that Southview Farm is a CAFO is a reasonable application of the
CWA and its implementing regulations to a dairy with industrial characteristics. The court's interpretation is also consistent with legislative
intent. Having specifically included CAFOs as point sources under the
Act, ' it is unlikely that Congress intended for large industrial operations to escape regulation as CAFOs by locating in a rural setting.
The Second Circuit's reasoning could be extended to other, less
obtrusive, animal confinement practices currently degrading water quality.
For instance, some commentators argue that certain grazing operations
should be designated as CAFOs." Richard H. Braun points to the use of
"sacrifice areas" and "water gaps" as "analogous to [CAFOs].""' In
these areas, cattle trample and denude the ground until there is little or no
vegetation left to help assimilate the animal waste, which may be discharged directly into streams. Following the Second Circuit's reasoning,
the mere presence of surrounding grasslands would not preclude a CAFO
designation if there was no vegetation in the watering area itself and other
CAFO criteria were met." 2 If water gaps or sacrifice areas were designated as CAFOs, they would be, by 4statutory definition, point sources" 3 and
subject to the NPDES program."
Unfortunately, meeting the requisite criteria for designation as a CAFO
is no guarantee that permit requirements will be enforced against an agricultural facility. The EPA and delegated states have thus far shown little enthusiasm for vigorously pursuing CAFO permitting."' But operation of a CAFO

Indus., Inc., 931 F.2d 1055, 1057-60 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding cattle feedlot on 230 acres is a CAFO
even though use of liquid manure to irrigate and fertilize three adjacent fields complied with EPA's
effluent limitation guidelines).
109. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
110. See generally DENZEL FERGUSON & NANCY FERGUSON, SACRED COWS AT TEE PUBLIC
TROUGH (1983); Richard H. Braun, Emerging Limits on FederalLand Management Discretion:Livestock, Riparian Ecosystems, and Clean Water Law, 17 ENVTL. L. 43 (1986).
111. "Sacrifice areas" are the trampled out areas near watering facilities, and "water gaps" are
small lengths of a stream left unfenced to provide cattle access. Braun, supra note 112, at 71 n.88.
The author points out that "[n]o court has yet addressed [the] question" of whether these areas qualify
as point sources under the CWA. Id.
for a
112. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text. The pertinent Appendix B criterion
cattle feeding operation requires confinement of more than 1000 slaughter and feeder cattle. 40
C.F.R. Pt. 122, app. B.
113. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
114. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a).
115. "[t]n 1992, less than 10 percent of the estimated 10,000 livestock operations sufficiently
large to be classified as CAFOs held NPDES permits." Frarey & Pratt, supra note 93, at 9. The EPA
did issue a general permit applicable to all feedlots in its Region 6 (Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma and Texas), imposing detailed management practices, and prohibiting the creation of any enviseq. (1993). The permit defines
ronmental or public health hazard. Id. at 10; 58 Fed. Reg. 7610 et.
runoff from land containing applied manure as a point source of pollution, and requires that these
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without a permit creates the opportunity for individuals and groups to use
citizen's suits to compel enforcement of the Act's NPDES requirements." 6
Faced with the prospect of meeting NPDES requirements or having their
operations enjoined by citizen-suits, agricultural interests might "voluntarily"
develop more environmentally sound practices. If these operations cannot be
defined as point sources and are left virtually unregulated as NPS pollution,
reliance on voluntary change seems futile."'
Clarifying "AgriculturalStormwaterDischarge"
In declining to apply the "agricultural stormwater discharge" exemption to the effluent that migrated off Southview's field, the Second Circuit
focused its inquiry on the cause of the discharge. The court looked beyond the mere fact that it had rained to "whether the discharges were the
result of precipitation." " ' Similarly, albeit arriving at a different conclusion, the district court also focused its analysis" 9 and that of the jury on
the cause of the discharges. 2t Both courts rejected Southview's position
that Congress intended a "blanket exclusion" of "any agricultural pollution picked up by rainstorm runoff." 21

Contrary to Southview's subsequent charge that the Second Circuit read
the exemption to mean that "only pure rainwater" " was exempt, the court
held that "there can be no escape from liability for agricultural pollution simply because it occurs on rainy day."" Rather than reflecting "a burst of

.process water discharges" be permitted. 58 Fed. Reg. 7632. Thus, the EPA has brought some
crude liquid manure handling systems under the purview of the CWA. The EPA rule is in accord
with the decision in Southview Farm. See 34 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1994).
116. 33 U.S.C. § 1365. See supra note 15. (Southview Farm was brought under the citizen-suit
provision of the CWA.).
117. The EPA admits that voluntary efforts alone are not generally sufficient to deal with NPS
pollution. EPA, NONPOINT SOURCES: AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE 19-20 (1989). Since most of the
effects of NPS pollution are off-farm, agriculturalists have little incentive to undertake voluntary
efforts. Gould, supra note 41, at 489.
118. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d at 121 (emphasis added).
119. CARE 11, 834 F. Supp. at 1426-30. The district court concluded that the effluent "would
have remained on [Southview'sJ land had it not been for a heavy rain." Id. at 1429 (emphasis added).
The district court recognized, however, that the agricultural stormwater exemption was not "limitless;" a court could consider whether the discharge had "been caused by defendants, not by the effects of natural precipitation." Id. (emphasis added).
120. The district court's charge to the jury regarding the "agricultural storwater discharge"
exemption focused its inquiry on the cause of the discharge: "Disparate, random, naturally induced
run-off of pollutants, whatever kind, caused primarily by rainfall or other natural precipitation around
activities that employ or cause pollutants is not a point source discharge." Respondents' Brief, supra
note 11, at 18 (emphasis in original).
121. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 109, at 15-17.
122. Id. at 2 (emphasis in original).
123. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d at 120.
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environmental zeal,"" u the court's decision recognizes nearly twenty years of
EPA regulation of stormwater discharges based on whether the discharge was
"caused or initiated solely by natural processes."121 Moreover, the court's socalled "sufficient quantities" test"2 acknowledges that naturally occurring
precipitation will cause effluent to migrate off fields, but recognizes that at
some point the pollutant may subsume the stormwater. The court explicitly
recognized that "agricultural stormwater run-off has always been considered
[NPS] pollution exempt from the Act,"' 7 but refused to allow parties to skirt
the CWA simply by dumping pollutants on the ground without regard for absorption capacity at the dumping site.12
Vehicles as Point Sources
The Second Circuit's ruling that the manure spreading vehicles were
point sources is consistent with case law'29 and within the statutory language of the CWA, which defines "point source" to include a "container"
or "rolling stock."1 30 The fact that the spreaders did not dump liquid
manure directly into navigable waters does not, as Southview contended,
make the connection between the equipment and the eventual discharge
too "indirect" to constitute a point source discharge. 31
32
The statutory definition of point source has been interpreted broadly.
Similarly, the CWA contains no requirement that a point source discharge
must be directly into navigable waters to violate the Act. 33 To the contrary,

124. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 109, at 2-3.
125. 41 Fed. Reg. 7963, 7964 (1976). See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
126. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d at 121. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. The court
found "that sufficient quantities of manure were present so that the run-off could not be classified as
'stormwater.'" Southview Farm, 34 F.3d at 121. Southview characterizes this as imposing a "'sufficient quantities' test amount[ing] to a judicial device to rescind this unqualified Congressional exemption (for agricultural stormwater runoff] and substitute a judge-made rule." Petitioners' Brief, supra
note 109, at 16-17.
127. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d at 120.
128. The U.S. Brief also raised this concern: "The CWA's statutory prohibition on discharges
of pollutants from point sources (such as CAFOs) would be of little value if the persons responsible
for such discharges could avoid responsibility merely by placing those pollutants onto the ground,
where, as here, the discharges are made at such rates, in such quantities, and at times that the pollutants would naturally and foreseeably be washed into the waters of the United States in a matter of
hours or days." Brief for U.S., supra note 81, at 17-18.
129. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
130. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
131. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 109, at 18-19.
132. See supra note 70.
United States v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 438 F. Supp. 945 (W.D. Tenn. 1976)
133. See, e.g.,
(holding discharges into municipal sewers which eventually emptied into a river are a point source);
O'Leary v. Moyer's Landfill, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 642 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (holding landfill discharging
through "gullies, trenches and ditches" is a point source).
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the legislative history of the Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972
indicates the Senate noted that "discharge" includes both "direct and indirect
discharges into the navigable waters."'3' The fact that a manure spreader did
not discharge directly into navigable waters is not dispositive. At best, the
question of "directness" raises a factual question for the jury.
CONCLUSION

The modern trend toward industrialized agriculture demands
thoughtful interpretation, or perhaps reinterpretation, of the CWA's agricultural exemptions. Thus, the Second Circuit did not "judicial[ly]
override

. . .

federal legislation"135 in designating Southview Farm a

CAFO subject to NPDES permit requirements. Nor did the court judicially "rescind"' 3 6 the "agricultural stormwater discharge" exemption by
refusing to apply it to Southview's practice of over-saturating its fields
with liquid manure. To the contrary, in restoring the jury's verdict, the
court read the agricultural exemptions and implementing regulations in a
manner consistent with the overall legislative goal of "restor[ing] and
maintain[ing] the . . . integrity of the Nation's waters."' 37 The Second
Circuit's decision may signal a new and necessary rigor in applying the

CWA to agricultural operations. Industrialized agricultural operations
should not be allowed to pollute at will by hiding behind exemptions
clearly designed to protect traditional mixed-use farms.
SUSAN E. SCHELL

134. A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF
1972, VOL. 1, at 178 (USGPO SER. No.93-1, 1973). The House also noted that "the term 'discharge

of a pollutant,' does not in any way contemplate that the discharge be directly from the point source
to the waterway." Id. at 255.
135.

Petitioners' Brief, supra note 109, at 2. See supra note 128.

136. Id. at 16-17.
137. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
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